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Summary
The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 and is the principal
international organization governing world trade.  It has 146 member countries,
representing over 95% of world trade.
On November 9-14, 2001, trade ministers from WTO countries met in Doha,
Qatar for their fourth Ministerial Conference.  At that meeting, they agreed to a work
program for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to conclude by January 1,
2005.  The work program folds on-going negotiations on agriculture and services into
a broader agenda that includes industrial tariffs, topics of interest to developing
countries, changes in WTO rules, and other provisions.  Because of the influence that
developing countries had in setting the work program, the round has become known
as the Doha Development Agenda.
Agriculture has been the linchpin in the Doha Development Agenda.  U.S. goals
were substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic support; elimination of export
subsidies, and improved market access.  Industrial trade barriers and services are
other market access topics in the negotiations.
There are three issues that are among the most important to developing
countries,  in addition to concessions on agriculture and textile/clothing trade.  One
issue pertains to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection.  A second
deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to
developing countries.  A third addresses problems that developing countries are
having in implementing current trade obligations.
In other areas, negotiators are meeting to clarify and improve disciplines under
the antidumping and subsidies agreements.  These talks on trade remedies are being
observed closely by some Members of Congress, who did not want the issue on the
agenda at all.  Other discussions in the WTO are addressing the so-called “Singapore
issues” — government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), investment
and competition.
The fifth Ministerial Conference was held September 10-14, 2003 in Cancun,
Mexico.  The Ministerial in Cancun was to “...take stock of progress in the
negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance, and take decisions as
necessary.”  The meeting, however, ended unsuccessfully.
In February 2004, WTO members approved new chairpersons for the WTO
bodies and working groups, and resumed negotiations in March 2004.  On July 31,
2004, WTO members approved a framework to guide remaining negotiations.  The
July 31 framework included important terms on agriculture.  Work is expected to
slow down through the rest of 2004 because of leadership changes in the European
Union and the U.S. elections. WTO members did not set a new deadline for the
negotiations, but they did decide that the next Ministerial Conference will be in Hong
Kong in December 2005.
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1 The WTO staff is based in Geneva and numbers about 550.  The organization is headed
by a Director-General. 
World Trade Organization Negotiations:
The Doha Development Agenda
Background
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the principal international
organization governing world trade.  It has 146 member countries, representing over
95% of world trade.
The WTO was established in 1995 as a successor institution to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The GATT was a post-World War II
institution that was intended to promote nondiscrimination in trade among countries,
with the view that open trade was crucial for economic stability and peace.
Decisions within the WTO are made by member countries, not WTO staff1, and
they are made by consensus, not formal vote. High-level policy decisions are made
by the Ministerial Conference, which is the body of political representatives (trade
ministers) from each member country.  The Ministerial Conference must meet at least
every two years.  Operational decisions are made by the General Council, which
consists of a representative from each member country.  The General Council meets
monthly, and the chair rotates annually among national representatives.  
The United States was an original signatory to the GATT and a leading
proponent of the GATT’s free-market principles.  It continues to be among the
countries urging further discussions on opening markets to trade.  Although decisions
in the WTO are by consensus, the United States has a highly influential role in the
WTO, because it is the largest trader in the world.
Periodically, member countries agree to hold negotiations to revise existing
rules or establish new ones.  These periodic negotiations are commonly called
“rounds.”  The broader the negotiations, the greater the possible trade-offs, and thus
theoretically the greater the potential economic benefits to countries.  The
multilateral negotiations are especially important to developing countries, which
might otherwise be left out of more selective agreements.  It must be remembered,
however, that trade liberalization also results in job losses and other economic
dislocations as well. 
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2 For information on the results of the Doha Ministerial Conference, see CRS Report
RL31206, The WTO Doha Ministerial: Results and Agenda for a New Round of
Negotiations, coordinated by William H. Cooper.
3 World Trade Organization.  Annual Report 2002.  p. 10.
4  Calculated by CRS from data presented in the 2002 WTO Annual Report, p. 40.
5 For a discussion of the effect of free-trade agreements, see CRS Report RL31356, Free
Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by
William H. Cooper.
What Began at Doha?
On November 9-14, 2001, trade ministers from member countries met in Doha,
Qatar for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference.  At that meeting, they agreed to
undertake a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.2
Before the Doha Ministerial, negotiations had already been underway on trade
in agriculture and trade in services.  These on-going negotiations had been required
under the last round of multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round, 1986-
1994).  However, some countries, including the United States, wanted to expand the
agriculture and services talks to allow trade-offs and thus achieve greater trade
liberalization.
There were additional reasons for the negotiations.  Some officials thought that
a new round of multilateral trade negotiations could help the sagging world economy.
According to the WTO, the year 2001 showed “...the lowest growth in output in more
than two decades,” and world trade actually contracted that year.3
Just months before the Doha Ministerial, the United States had been attacked
by terrorists on September 11, 2001.  Some government officials called for greater
political cohesion and saw the trade negotiations as a means toward that end.
Also at the time, countries were increasingly seeking bilateral or regional trade
agreements.  In 2001, almost 250 regional trade arrangements were either in force or
under negotiation.4  There is disagreement on whether these more limited trade
agreements help or hurt the multilateral system.  Some experts say that regional
agreements are easier to negotiate, allow a greater degree of liberalization, and thus
are effective in opening markets.  Others, however, argue that the regional
agreements violate the general nondiscrimination principle of the WTO (which
allows some exceptions), deny benefits to many poor countries that are often not
party to the arrangements, and distract resources away from the WTO negotiations.5
With the backdrop of a sagging world economy, terrorist action, and a growing
number of regional trade arrangements, trade ministers met in Doha.  At that
meeting, they adopted three documents that provided guidance for future actions.
The Ministerial Declaration includes a preamble and a work program for the new
round and for other future action.  The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health presents a political interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  A document on Implementation-
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6 The Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2), and the Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/17) are available through the WTO home page at
[http://www.wto.org/].
7 U.S. International Trade Commission.  The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the
Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the
U.S. Economy.  Publication 3621.  August 2003.
Related Issues and Concerns includes numerous decisions of interest to developing
countries.6
The work program folded the on-going negotiations in agriculture and services
into a broader agenda.  That agenda includes industrial tariffs, topics of interest to
developing countries, changes to WTO rules, and other provisions.
Especially worth noting is how the role of developing countries changed at the
Doha Ministerial.  Since the beginning of the GATT, the major decision-makers were
almost exclusively developed countries.  At the preceding Ministerial Conference
(Seattle, 1999), developing countries became more forceful in demanding that their
interests be addressed.  Some developing countries insisted that they would not
support another round of multilateral negotiations unless they realized some
concessions up-front and the agenda included their interests.  Because of the greater
influence of developing countries in setting the plan of action at Doha, the new round
became known as the Doha Development Agenda.
At the Doha meeting, trade ministers agreed in the Ministerial Declaration that
the fifth Ministerial, which would be the next one, would “take stock of progress,
provide any necessary political guidance, and take decisions as necessary.” WTO
members subsequently decided that the fifth Ministerial will be held in Cancun,
Mexico, on September 10-14, 2003.  The Doha Ministerial Declaration directs that
negotiations be concluded not later than January 1, 2005.  With the exception of
actions on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, trade ministers agreed that the
outcome of the negotiations would be a single undertaking, which means that nothing
is agreed to until everything is agreed to.  Thus, countries agreed they would reach
a single, comprehensive agreement containing a balance of concessions at the end of
the negotiations.
Significance of the Negotiations
Trade economists argue that the reduction of trade barriers allows a more
efficient exchange of products among countries and encourages economic growth.
Multilateral negotiations offer the greatest potential benefits by obliging countries
throughout the world to reduce barriers to trade.  The gains to the United States and
to the world from multilateral trade agreements have been calculated in the billions
of dollars.  For example, a recent study by the International Trade Commission found
that if the tariff cuts from the Uruguay Round were removed, the welfare loss to the
United States would be about $20 billion.7  A study by the University of Michigan
found that if all trade barriers in agriculture, services, and manufactures were reduced
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8 Brown, Drusilla K., Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern.  Computational Analysis of
Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round and Doha Development Round.
Discussion Paper No. 489.  School of Public Policy.  The University of Michigan.
December 8, 2002.
by 33% as a result of the Doha Development Agenda, there would be an increase in
global welfare of $574.0 billion.8
Multilateral negotiations are especially important to developing countries that
might otherwise be left out of a regional or bilateral trade agreement.  Developing
country blocs can improve trade and economic growth among its members, but the
larger share of benefits are from the trade agreements that open the markets of the
world.  Multilateral trade negotiations are also an exercise in international
cooperation and encourage economic interdependence, which offers political benefits
as well.
When a country opens its markets, however, increased imports might cause
economic dislocations at the local or regional level.  Communities might lose
factories.  Workers might lose their jobs.  For those who experience such losses,
multilateral trade agreements do not improve their economic well-being.  Also, if a
country takes an action that is not in compliance with an agreement to which it is a
party, it might face some form of sanction.  Further, some oppose WTO rules that
restrict how a country is permitted to respond to imports of an overseas product that
employs an undesirable production method, for example a process that might use
limited resources or impose unfair working conditions.  Thus, while multilateral trade
agreements have been found to offer broad economic benefits, they are opposed for
a variety of reasons as well.
  
The Doha Agenda
At the Doha Ministerial, trade ministers directed that a Trade Negotiations
Committee (TNC) be established to supervise the negotiations and have its first
meeting not later than January 31, 2002.  Countries decided that the chair of the TNC
should be WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi.  The negotiations are being
held in five newly established working groups and in other, existing bodies in the
WTO.  Selected topics under negotiation are discussed below in five groups: market
access; development issues; Singapore issues; WTO rules; and other issues.
Market Access
Agriculture.  Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture that was reached in
the mid-1990s during the Uruguay Round called for continued negotiations toward
“...the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and
protection....”  By early 2001, WTO members had achieved some preliminary work
in those sectoral negotiations, and later that year, agriculture was wrapped into the
broader Doha agenda.
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Charles E. Hanrahan.
10 See “Swiss formula” in CRS Report 97-905, Agriculture: A Glossary of Terms, Programs,
and Laws, 4th Edition, coordinated by Jasper Womach.
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Agriculture has been the linchpin in the Doha Development Agenda.9  U.S.
goals in the new round were elimination of agricultural export subsidies, easing of
tariffs and quotas, and reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.  The Doha
Ministerial Declaration included language on all of these three pillars of agricultural
support.  It stated that the members committed to “comprehensive negotiations aimed
at substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade distorting
support.”
In the Declaration, trade ministers agreed to a March 31, 2003 deadline for
negotiators to agree on modalities in the agriculture talks.  Modalities are formulas
or other measures by which a goal is reached.  For example, in the negotiations to
reduce agricultural tariffs, the United States supports the “Swiss formula, which
reduces higher tariffs more than lower tariffs: Final tariff = (initial tariff  x a)/(initial
tariff + a), where a is a coefficient that negotiators must determine.10 
The chairman of the WTO working group on agriculture, Stuart Harbinson,
submitted a first draft of a modalities paper in mid-February 2003 for countries to
consider before the March 31 deadline.  Virtually every country opposed the draft.
The EU and Japan said that the draft was too rigid and did not include some practices
that should fall under disciplines, such as export credits.  The United States and a
group of agriculture exporters known as the Cairns Group argued that the Harbinson
draft did not go far enough in opening markets.
Another point of disagreement was the inclusion in the Harbinson draft of a
proposal that would allow developing countries to identify certain “special products”
that would be protected from market opening.  Developing countries were divided
on whether such a list should be included.  Developed countries generally opposed
the concept.
Harbinson issued a revision of the draft in mid-March 2003, but countries were
unchanged in their opposition, and negotiators missed the March 31, 2003 deadline
for agriculture modalities.  One reason for the delay was that the EU had not
completed reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which would influence
its negotiating position.  A major issue for the EU was whether or not to approve
separation (“decoupling”) of payments to farmers based on production.  Those types
of payments are among the most trade-distorting (“amber box”).  On June 26, 2003,
EU agriculture ministers approved a reform package that included partial decoupling
for certain products.  The action was seen by many as a positive step for advancing
the trade negotiations.11
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The EU reform largely addressed one of the three pillars of agricultural reform
 — domestic support — but did little in a second pillar — market access.  In the
WTO negotiations on market access, the United States and the Cairns Group support
a leveling, or harmonizing, of tariff peaks, or high rates.  In comparison, the EU and
Japan want flexibility to cut some items less than others to arrive at an average total
rate cut.  The formula for reducing agricultural tariffs remains a problem.
Another difficulty is “geographical indications,” or the protection of product
names that reflect the original location of the product.  An example is the use of
“Bordeaux wine” for wines from the Bordeaux region only.  Europeans, joined by
India and some other countries, want a mandatory registry of geographical indications
that would prevent other countries from using the names.  The United States and yet
other countries refuse to negotiate a mandatory list, but will accept a voluntary list
with no enforcement power.  The EU says it will not accept an agriculture agreement
without a geographical registry.12
Developing countries view reform in agricultural trade as one of their most
important goals.  They argue that their own producers cannot compete against the
surplus agricultural goods that the developed countries, principally the EU and the
United States, are selling on the world market at low, subsidized prices.  Some
African countries also are calling for an end to cotton subsidies, claiming that such
subsidies are destroying markets for the smaller African producers.
In the month before the Cancun Ministerial, several new proposals on
agriculture were offered.  On August 13, 2003, the United States and the EU released
a joint proposal that seemed to ignite action by other countries.13  Many countries,
including the Cairns Group, criticized the U.S.-EU proposal for not going far enough
in lowering domestic support or export subsidies.  Developing countries contended
that the U.S.-EU proposal would do little to help poorer countries.  There was broad
support, however, for the U.S.-EU approach to blend the leading formulas for
reducing agricultural tariffs, rather than pick one formula or the other.  The concept
of a blended approach to tariffs was part of a major proposal by about 20 developing
countries, including Argentina, Brazil, India, and China (the Group of 21).  Proposals
were also offered by several African countries and by a small number of developed
countries.
The differences between developing and developed countries was perhaps most
evident in the discussions on cotton subsidies.  Four African countries — Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali — called for an end to cotton subsidies and
compensation for losses.  The United States is a major provider of subsidies.  U.S.
negotiators responded by refusing to address cotton subsidies separately and calling
for subsidies to be considered as part of a broader context that included other fibers,
textiles, and apparel.
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Services.  Along with agriculture, services were a part of the “built-in agenda”
of the Uruguay Round.  The General Agreement on Trade In Services (GATS), which
was concluded in that Round, directs Members to “...enter into successive rounds of
negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement [January 1, 1995]...[to achieve] a progressively higher level of
liberalization.”
Those negotiations began in early 2000.  Negotiating guidelines and procedures
were established by March 2001.  Under the request-offer approach being used,
countries first request changes in other countries’ practices, other countries then
respond by making offers of changes, and finally the countries negotiate bilaterally
on a final agreement.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration recognized the work already undertaken and
reaffirmed the March 2001 guidelines as the basis for continuing the negotiations.
It directed participants to submit initial requests for specific commitments by June
30, 2002 and initial offers by March 31, 2003.
The services talks are going slowly.  There were about 50 requests made by the
June 2002 deadline.  By the Cancun Ministerial, there had only been about 30 offers,
and many of the offers would simply keep in place changes that have already been
made.14  In May 2003, the head of the working group on services commented on the
slow pace of the negotiations and wondered whether the offers were liberalization or
standstill commitments.15  A major reason for the slow pace is that countries want to
see what will be decided in the agriculture talks before they decide what they are
willing to offer in other market access areas.
A controversial issue is so-called “Mode 4” services.  Mode 4 relates to the
temporary movement of business persons to another country in order to perform a
service on-site.  Developing countries want easier movement of their nationals under
Mode 4.  They claim that the services negotiations have centered on the
establishment of businesses in other countries, which has been a focus of developed
countries, while there has been no negotiation on Mode 4, which would help them.
Developed countries, especially the United States, have opposed discussions on
Mode 4 services trade.  Congress might oppose easier entry for business persons,
based on Senate approval of a resolution (S.Res. 211) expressing the sense of the
Senate that future U.S. trade agreements and implementing legislation should not
contain immigration-related provisions.  Mode 4 services will be a difficult issue to
resolve.
Non-Agricultural Market Access.  In the Doha Declaration, trade ministers
agreed to negotiations to reduce or eliminate tariffs, including tariff peaks, high
tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as nontariff barriers.  They accepted less than full
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reciprocity in reductions for developing and least-developed countries.  The
modalities for the reduction or elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers were to be
determined by the end of May 2003.
In mid-May 2003, the chairman of the working group, Pierre-Louis Girard,
issued a first draft of a modalities agreement.  Most countries complained about it.
The draft proposed a formula cut based on average bound tariffs16, and it included
tariff elimination for specific sectors.  The United States and the EU wanted a more
aggressive approach that would result in greater tariff reductions, especially for high
tariffs.  They argued for applied rates, rather than the higher bound rates, as the basis
for reduction.  The United States favored the proposed sectoral negotiations.
Developing countries with high tariff peaks, such as India, did not support the May
2003 draft, but other developing countries were not as opposed because of provisions
on special and differential treatment.
On August 18, 2003, the chairman said that the group could not reach agreement
on modalities, and he would present a framework instead to the General Council
before the fifth Ministerial in Cancun.17
Development Issues
Three development issues are most noteworthy.  One pertains to compulsory
licensing of medicines and patent protection.  A second deals with a review of
provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing countries.  A third
addresses problems that developing countries were having in implementing current
trade obligations.
Access to Patented Medicines.  A major topic at the Doha Ministerial
regarded the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).  The issue involves the balance of interests between the
pharmaceutical companies in developed countries that held patents on medicines and
the public health needs in developing countries.  Before the Doha meeting, the United
States claimed that the current language in TRIPS was flexible enough to address
health emergencies, but other countries insisted on new language.
Section 6 of the Doha document Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (TRIPS Declaration), countries recognized that “...WTO Members
with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector could
face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement.”  In Section 6, the trade ministers instructed the WTO TRIPS Council
“...to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the [WTO] General
Council before the end of 2002.”
On December 16, 2002, then-TRIPS Council chairman Eduardo Perez Motta
produced a draft that would allow countries that lack the manufacturing capacity to
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produce medicines to issue compulsory licenses for imports of the medicines.  All
WTO members approved of the chairman’s draft except the United States.  The U.S.
position, representing the interests of the pharmaceutical industry, was that the
chairman’s draft did not include enough protections against exploitation of
compulsory licenses.  The United States sought a limit on the diseases that would be
covered by the chairman’s text, but other countries refused a list of diseases.  The
United States decided to oppose the chairman’s draft and unilaterally promised not
to bring a dispute against any least-developed country that issued compulsory
licenses for certain medicines.
One concern of the pharmaceutical industry was that the medicines sent to the
developing country might be diverted instead to another country.  To address this
problem, it was suggested that the medicines be marked so that they can be tracked.
Another concern was that more advanced developing countries might use the generic
medicines to develop their own industries.  For this problem, it was proposed that
countries voluntarily “opt-out,” or promise not to use compulsory licensing.
On August 30, 2003, WTO members reached agreement on the TRIPS and
medicines issue.  Voting in the General Council, member governments approved a
decision that offered an interim waiver under the TRIPS Agreement allowing a
member country to export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licences
to least-developed and certain other members.  An accompanying statement by the
General Council chair, Carlos Perez del Castillo, included provisions that the United
States insisted on as a condition of accepting the decision.  The statement represented
several “key shared understandings” of Members regarding the Decision, including
the recognition that the decision should be used to protect public health and not be
an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives, and the
recognition that products should not be diverted from the intended markets.  The
statement listed a number of countries that either agreed to opt out of using the
system as importers or agreed that they would only use the system in national
emergencies or extreme urgency.
Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment.  In the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, the trade ministers reaffirmed special and differential (S&D) treatment
for developing countries and agreed that all S&D treatment provisions “...be
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective
and operational.”  In the Declaration, the trade ministers endorsed the work program
on S&D treatment presented in another Doha document, Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (Implementation Decision).  That
document called on the WTO Committee on Trade and Development to identify the
S&D treatment provisions that are already mandatory and those that are non-binding,
and to consider the implications of “...converting [S&D] treatment measures into
mandatory provisions, to identify those that Members consider should be made
mandatory, and to report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a
decision by July 2002.”  It also called for the Committee on Trade and Development
“to examine additional ways in which S&D treatment provisions can be made more
effective, to consider ways...in which developing countries...may be assisted to make
best use of [S&D] treatment provisions, and to report to the General Council with
clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002.”
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The issues have been split along a developing-country/developed-country
divide.  Developing countries wanted to negotiate on changes to S&D provisions,
keep proposals together in the Committee on Trade and Development, and set shorter
deadlines.  Developed countries wanted to study S&D provisions, send some
proposals to negotiating groups, and leave deadlines more open. Developing
countries claimed that the developed countries were not negotiating in good faith,
while developed countries argued that the developing countries were unreasonable
in their proposals.
By the Cancun Ministerial, developing countries had offered about 85 proposals
on S&D provisions, but developed countries had agreed to only a handful of these.
The July 2002 deadline for the Committee on Trade and Development to report to the
General Council passed without a report, as did a year-end 2002 deadline and a mid-
February 2003 deadline.  In February 2003, the General Council chair transferred the
S&D talks into the General Council and split the proposals into three groups: (1)
about 30-40 would stay in the General Council for a decision (countries had agreed
on only 15 proposals by July 2003); (2) 38 were sent to negotiating groups with
instruction to consider the proposals quickly and report back in time for the Cancun
Ministerial; and (3) the rest were labeled unlikely for agreement.  No new deadlines
have been set.
Implementation Issues.  Developing countries claim that they have had
problems with the implementation of the agreements reached in the earlier Uruguay
Round because of limited capacity or lack of technical assistance.  They also claim
that they have not realized certain benefits that they expected from the Round, such
as increased access for their textiles and apparel in developed-country markets.  They
seek a clarification of language relating to their interests in existing agreements.
Before the Doha Ministerial, WTO Members resolved a small number of these
implementation issues.  At the Doha meeting, the Ministerial Declaration directed a
two-path approach for the large number of remaining issues:  (a) where a specific
negotiating mandate is provided, the relevant implementation issues will be
addressed under that mandate; and (b) the other outstanding implementation issues
will be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies.  The latter were
directed to report to the Trade Negotiating Committee by the end of 2002 for
appropriate action.
There was not enough agreement for the year-end 2002 report by the relevant
WTO bodies to the Trade Negotiating Committee.  Developed and developing
countries had not been able to agree on implementation issues such as the growth rate
of textile quotas and special treatment under subsidies rules.  In February 2003, the
chair of the Trade Negotiating Committee directly took over the work on
implementation issues and worked with the WTO bodies.  By the end of July 2003,
there had been little progress on resolving the implementation issues.
Singapore Issues
The first WTO Ministerial Conference, which was held in Singapore in 1996,
established permanent working groups on four issues: transparency in government
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procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and investment18, and trade and
competition.  These became known as the Singapore issues.
At the Doha Ministerial, the EU pressed for negotiation on broad rules for all
of these four issues.  The United States had supported negotiations on the two issues
related to market access — government procurement and trade facilitation — but did
not openly support the other two issues — investment and competition.  Developing
countries opposed any talks on investment and competition.  As a compromise, the
Doha Ministerial Declaration stated that further clarification will be undertaken on
all four Singapore issues before the fifth Ministerial (at Cancun), and negotiations
will take place after the fifth Ministerial on the basis of a decision to be taken by
consensus [italics added].
By the Cancun Ministerial, there had been little movement from the positions
held at Doha.  The EU and Japan insisted that all four issues be considered as a
block.  The United States and some other countries appeared to be open to
consideration of the issues on a separate basis.  India and a few other developing
countries were adamantly opposed to any negotiation on competition and investment,
but might have considered further study of the topics.
The investment issue has been especially controversial, and certain issues have
come to light in the negotiations.  First, investment negotiations could possibly
overlap and even conflict with some rules under the GATS on establishment of
service providers.  A decision might have to be made on whether goods only, or
goods and services, would be covered under any investment agreement.  Second, the
United States reportedly wanted portfolio investment, in addition to foreign direct
investment, included in an agreement, but seemed to be alone in this approach.
Third, an “opt-in/opt-out” approach has been mentioned that would permit countries
to be flexible in participating in a Singapore issue agreement, but response to this
approach has been dubious.
WTO Rules
Trade Remedies.  At Doha, the United States was opposed to negotiations
on trade remedies, especially antidumping.  However, it faced almost universal
opposition and eventually was unsuccessful in keeping out the language on trade
remedies.  The Ministerial Declaration states that members “...agree to negotiations
aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines...” under the WTO antidumping and
subsidies agreements.  U.S. officials point out that the Declaration also states that the
“...basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements and their
instruments and objectives” would be preserved.  Congressional leaders, however,
are highly critical of this concession by U.S. trade negotiators.19
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The Ministerial Declaration also calls for clarifying and improving disciplines
on fisheries subsidies, and both the Ministerial Declaration and the Implementation
Decision have special provisions on trade remedies and developing countries.  In
addition to trade remedies, the Declaration calls for clarifying and improving WTO
disciplines and procedures on regional trade agreements.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration identified two phases for the work on trade
remedies: “In the initial phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the
provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to clarify
and improve in the subsequent phase.”  No deadlines were set for these phases.  So
far, countries are still essentially in the first phase.
In its submissions to the WTO, the United States has sought to preserve national
laws on trade remedies, and direct attention to dumping and subsidy practices rather
than their remedial duties.20  Almost all other countries, however, are seeking
changes to the WTO rules on duties.  The leading proponents of such changes have
been a group of 15 developed and developing countries called Friends of
Antidumping (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan,
Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Turkey; not all countries sign onto every proposal).  They have made numerous
proposals, and in essence their proposals would reduce the incidence and amount of
duties.  Many of their proposals would require a change in U.S. laws.  Although the
EU is a major user of trade remedies and not a member of Friends of Antidumping,
it has agreed with some of the group’s proposals.
There reportedly has been some domestic disagreement on whether the U.S.
stance should be a defensive one, where the United States avoids any change to
existing WTO dumping and subsidies agreements, or an active one, where the United
States seeks changes that could address problems with foreign practices.21  Some
observers have said that this conflict represents the different interests of U.S. import-
competing industries and U.S. export industries.  The United States has sought some
changes in the WTO rules, submitting papers on antidumping proposals on issues
such as transparency, foreign practices to circumvent a duty order, and the WTO
standard used by dispute panels in reviewing national applications of trade remedy
laws.
The United States also has submitted proposals on subsidies, such as expanding
a list of prohibited subsidies and imposing disciplines on support to sales of natural
resources.  It has suggested that the WTO consider sectoral negotiations on steel
subsidies similar to on-going talks in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), but there appears little support for this suggestion.  The
United States and the EU support limits on fisheries subsidies, but Japan strongly
opposes such limits.
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Dispute Settlement.  At the end of the Uruguay Round, trade ministers called
for a full review of WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures within four years
after entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO.  That deadline, January
1, 1999, passed without a review completed.
At Doha, trade ministers continued the call for a review of dispute rules.  The
Ministerial Declaration directed that  negotiations be held on improvements and
clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  They stated that the
negotiations should be based on work done so far and on any additional proposals.
They set a deadline of May 2003.  They directed that these DSU negotiations would
be separate from the rest of the negotiations and would not be a part of the single
undertaking.
Members are examining nearly all of the 27 Articles in the DSU.    In early April
2003, the chair of the working group, Peter Balas, circulated a framework document
that included over 50 proposals.  There was some dissatisfaction that the document
needed more focus.  On May 16, 2003, the chair issued another text that was
accepted by most countries.  The United States and the EU favored additional
reforms that were not a part of the text.  For example, the United States has called for
open public access to proceedings, and the EU had sought a roster of permanent
dispute panelists.
At the July 24, 2003 meeting of the General Council, WTO members approved
a new deadline of May 31, 2004.  They said that the May 16, 2003  text would be the
basis for the negotiations “as well as proposals submitted by members.”
Other Issues
Environment.  The Ministerial Declaration included several provisions on
trade and environment.  Among the provisions, the trade ministers agreed to the
following: (1) negotiations on the relationship between existing WTO rules and trade
obligations in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); (2) procedures for the
exchange of information between MEA Secretariats and WTO committees, and the
criteria for granting observer status; and (3) the reduction or elimination of trade
barriers to environmental goods and services.  It was agreed at Doha that the WTO’s
Committee on Trade and Environment shall report on these and other issues to the
fifth Ministerial (Cancun) and make recommendations where appropriate.
The EU has said that its priorities include observer status for MEAs.  The
United States is pushing for rules on fisheries subsidies, as mentioned above, and
tariff reductions on environmental products.
E-Commerce.  The trade ministers at Doha took note of the work that has
been done in the General Council and agreed to continue the Work Program on
Electronic Commerce.  They instructed the General Council to report on further
progress and report to the fifth Ministerial.  They declared that Members will
maintain their current practice of not imposing duties on electronic transmissions
until the Fifth Ministerial.  A major issue for electronic commerce is whether such
commerce should be classified as trade in goods (U.S.-supported) or as trade in
services (EU-supported).
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Recent Developments
The WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September 2003 was seen as an
opportunity for countries to agree on a framework to guide talks through the end of
the round, but that did not happen.  Negotiating sessions were cancelled after the
meeting.  They have not yet resumed, but might begin again in the next month.
The Cancun Ministerial 
An important milepost during the Doha Development Agenda was the fifth
Ministerial Conference, which was held in Cancún, Mexico on September 10-14,
2003.  The Doha Ministerial Declaration stated, “The Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference will take stock of progress in the negotiations, provide any necessary
political guidance, and take decisions as necessary.”  The Cancún Ministerial,
however, ended without agreement on a framework to guide future negotiations.22
The failure to advance the round indicated a serious loss of momentum and brought
into question whether the January 1, 2005 deadline would be met.
The Cancun Ministerial collapsed for several reasons.  First, differences over
the Singapore issues seemed irresolvable.  The EU had retreated on some of its
demands, but several developing countries refused any consideration of these issues
at all.  Second, it was questioned whether some countries had come to Cancun with
a serious intention to negotiate.  In the view of some observers, a few countries
showed no flexibility in their positions and only repeated their demands rather than
talk about trade-offs.  Third, the wide difference between developing and developed
countries across virtually all topics was a major obstacle.  The U.S.-EU agricultural
proposal and that of the Group of 21, for example, show strikingly different
approaches to special and differential treatment.  Fourth, there was some criticism of
procedure.  Some claimed the agenda was too complicated.  Also, Cancun Ministerial
chairman, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, was faulted for ending
the meeting when he did, instead of trying to move the talks into areas where some
progress could have been made.
At the end of their meeting in Cancun, trade ministers issued a declaration
instructing their officials to continue working on outstanding issues.  They asked the
General Council chair, working with the Director-General, to convene a meeting of
the General Council at senior official level no later than December 15, 2003, “...to
take the action necessary at that stage to enable us to move towards a successful and
timely conclusion of the negotiations.”
Of possible importance to future negotiations is a text that was developed during
the Cancun Ministerial.  Ministerial chairman Derbez invited trade ministers to act
as facilitators in Cancun and help with negotiations in five groups: agriculture, non-
CRS-15
23 WTO document JOB(03)/150/Rev.2.
24 WTO web page at [http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/news03_e.htm].
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Summary of USTR letter at [http://www.ustr.gov/wto/2004-01-12-doha_advance.pdf].
Actual letter at Inside U.S. Trade.  Text: Zoellick Letter to Trade Ministers.  January 16,
2004.
agricultural market access, development issues, Singapore issues, and other issues.
The WTO Director-General served as a facilitator for a sixth group on cotton.  The
facilitators consulted with trade ministers and produced draft texts from their group
consultations.  The Ministerial chairman compiled the texts into a draft Ministerial
Declaration23 and circulated the revised draft among participants for comment.
The Derbez text was widely criticized at Cancun, but in the months since that
meeting, members have looked increasingly at this text as a possible negotiating
framework.  On agriculture, the Derbez text drew largely on both the U.S.-EU and
Group of 21 proposals.  It included a larger cut from domestic support programs than
the U.S.-EU proposal made, contained the blended tariff approach of the U.S.-EU
proposal but offered better terms for developing countries, and provided for the
elimination of export subsidies for products of particular interest to developing
countries.  On the Singapore issues, it included a decision to start new negotiations
on government procurement and trade facilitation, but not investment or competition
The Final Months of 2003
The final months of 2003 were a period of standstill and stock-taking.  The
WTO Director-General cancelled negotiating sessions until further notice.  After
holding consultations with member countries, the General Council chair told an
informal meeting of heads of delegations in Geneva on December 9, 2003, that there
had been some progress, but that there had been “little real negotiation, or movement
towards accommodation among positions.”24
At the December 15, 2003 meeting of the General Council, the WTO Director-
General said that although members were not yet at a point where negotiations could
resume full momentum, they now had a “clearer grasp of the remaining differences
and of the solutions needed to bridge them.”25  At the same meeting, the General
Council chair reviewed the consultations that had taken place since Cancun and
summarized the issues for further work in four key outstanding issues: agriculture,
cotton, non-agricultural market access and the Singapore issues.26  Countries
expressed support at the meeting for restarting the work of the negotiating groups.
Negotiations Resumed in 2004
In a letter dated January 11, 2004, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Zoellick
offered proposals on how to move the round forward.27  Among his proposals, the
USTR called for a focus on market access, including an elimination of agricultural
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export subsidies.  He also said that the Singapore issues could progress by
negotiating on trade facilitation, considering further action on government
procurement, and possibly dropping investment and competition.  He suggested that
the next Ministerial be held in Hong Kong before the end of 2004.  Other countries’
responses to the USTR’s letter have generally been positive regarding these
proposals.  He also suggested that the next General Council chair, which is an
annually rotating position, come from a developing country.  That proposal, however,
received almost no support.
On February 11, 2004, WTO members took two major steps relating to the Doha
round at their General Council Meeting.  First, members approved new chairpersons
for WTO bodies and for trade negotiating groups for the Doha round.  Of note, the
new General Council chair is Shotaro Oshima from Japan.  With these new
chairpersons, multilateral trade negotiations resumed in March.  Second, the General
Council made no decision on the next Ministerial Conference.  The United States had
wanted a commitment by WTO members to ensure momentum.  Other countries,
however, wanted to see more progress in the talks before scheduling another
ministerial meeting.
Following the collapse of negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial, the deadline
of January 2005 seemed unlikely to be met.  WTO members agreed that they would
try to reach a framework by the end of July 2004 to guide remaining negotiations.
They wanted to reach the framework by mid-year 2004, because they expected to lose
momentum in the second half of 2004 because of changes in European Union
leadership and U.S. elections.
On July 31, 2004, WTO members approved a framework agreement that
includes major developments in the most contentious and crucial issue — agriculture.
Because agriculture is the linchpin in the negotiations, the framework, which
provides guidelines but not specific concessions, is regarded as a major achievement.
With a broad agreement on agriculture and on other issues, negotiators have a clearer
direction for future discussions.  Negotiations might not resume seriously until 2005,
and no new deadline has been set.  When they approved the framework agreement,
however, WTO members also agreed to hold their next Ministerial in Hong Kong in
December 2005, and this might be seen as the possible end to the Doha round.
Congressional Role
Although the executive branch conducts trade negotiations in the WTO, the
Congress has constitutional responsibility for regulation of U.S. foreign commerce.
As part of this constitutional role, Congress conducts oversight of the negotiations.
Oversight might be in the forms of hearings or meetings with executive branch
officials.  Members often communicate their positions through public statements and
letters.  They may also act as advisors at trade negotiations.  
Under legislation on trade promotion authority that was passed in 2002 (P.L.
107-210), Congress prescribed trade objectives for U.S. negotiators in the Doha
Development Agenda and in other trade negotiations.  These objectives give
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direction to negotiators on U.S. priorities.  In the 2002 Act, Congress also outlined
requirements that the executive branch must meet, as a condition for expedited
procedures for legislation to implement trade agreements, including those reached in
the Doha Development Agenda.  Among the conditions for expedited legislative
procedures, the executive branch must consult with Congress at various stages of the
negotiations, notify Congress before taking specified actions, and submit reports as
outlined.  Expedited procedures would apply to any trade agreement entered into
(signed) before July 1, 2005.  A two-year extension to that deadline would be allowed
if the President requested the extension and Congress did not disapprove it.  
If agreements are reached at the end of the negotiations, Congress will face a
decision on whether to approve statutory changes to implement those agreements.
If all requirements are met by the executive branch, and unless Congress decides
otherwise, the trade agreements will be considered under trade promotion procedures
(fast-track procedures).  Under those procedures, an implementing bill is
automatically introduced, considered in committee and on the floor under specified
deadlines, and not amendable.
The Doha Development Agenda originally had a January 1, 2005 deadline, but
WTO members agreed to continue negotiations beyond that deadline with no new
final date.  If an agreement package is concluded and the United States signs it before
July 1, 2005, expedited procedures might apply to any implementing bill.  If an
agreement package is not reached by July 1, 2005, the President will have to request
the two-year extension under P.L. 107-210, and Congress might decide whether or
not to approve the extension.  Implementing legislation for any Doha round trade
agreements probably would not be introduced until late in 2005 at the earliest.
Although the 108th Congress is not expected to consider implementing legislation,
it is active in oversight and might consider resolutions or other legislation related to
the negotiations.
